The most noteworthy example of the policy of deterrence was

During the Cold War, deterrence was vital because the Soviet threat seemed huge. To Moscow, it must seem that the Cold War is only half over, since the WestвЂ™s deterrence posture, although muted, lives on. There are risks in relying on it and also in rejecting it when the alternatives are worse. That kind of confusion caused the United States to suddenly enter both the Korean War and the Gulf War, despite official statements in both cases that had led the aggressors to believe it would not.Дeterrence is not a strategy for all seasons. One of the biggest dangers, however, comes in the reverse situation, when Washington fails to declare deterrence in advance but then decides to fight when an unexpected attack comes. Deterrence should be ambiguous only if it is a bluff. When the United States does choose to apply deterrence and is willing to fight, the deterrent warning must be loud and clear, so the target cannot misread it. Deterrence is also a weak tool in the increasingly important realm of cyberspace, where it can be extremely difficult to be absolutely sure of an attackerвЂ™s identity. Thus, it is more useful against governments, which have a return address and want to survive, than against terrorists who cannot be found or who do not fear death. And even when deterrence is appropriate, it might not work-for example, against an enemy who is suicidal or invulnerable to a counterattack. At worst, it may provoke conflict rather than hold it in check. Academics have explored countless variations on that theme, but the basic concept is quite simple: an enemy will not strike if it knows the defender can defeat the attack or can inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.ДЄt best, applying deterrence when it is unneeded wastes resources. Bringing these problems into focus can restore faith in deterrence where it has been lost, lower costs where the strategy has been misapplied, and reduce the danger of surprise in situations where the risk of conflict is unclear.Дeterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war. Mistakes in applying deterrence have come from misunderstandings about the concept itself, faulty threat assessments, forgetfulness about history, and shortsighted policymaking. And most important, with regard to China, Washington is torn about whether or not to rely on deterrence at all, even though such confusion could lead to a crisis and a dangerous miscalculation in Beijing. More important, it has rejected deterrence where it should have embraced it, leading to one unnecessary and disastrous war with Iraq and the risk of another with Iran. Since the Cold War ended, the United States has clung to deterrence where it should not have, needlessly aggravating relations with Russia.

But in recent decades, deterrence has gone astray, and U.S.

It was the essential military strategy behind containing the Soviet Union and a crucial ingredient in winning the Cold War without fighting World War III. Its purpose, logic, and effectiveness were well understood. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was the backbone of U.S.

The most noteworthy example of the policy of deterrence was